Private equity

Margin Expansion in Private Equity: What the Data Says

Bain and McKinsey data on where PE returns come from, why margin plans miss, and a practical way for operating partners to baseline and track back-office cost.

In brief

For most of the last decade, buyout returns leaned on multiple expansion and leverage. Bain & Company now estimates that a typical deal needs 10% to 12% annual EBITDA growth to reach a 2.5x return over five years, against about 5% in the 2010s. Revenue growth carries most of that load. Margin expansion is planned in almost every deal and delivered in far fewer.

The gap is less about finding cost to cut and more about measurement: no baseline, savings tracked in a deck instead of the ledger, and reporting that arrives too late to act on. This piece walks through the numbers and a practical way to baseline and track back-office cost in a portfolio company.

Where returns came from

McKinsey's 2024 article Bridging private equity's value creation gap puts it plainly. For buyout deals entered in 2010 or later and exited by 2021, roughly two-thirds of total return can be attributed to market multiple expansion and leverage.

Bain's Global Private Equity Report 2026 quantifies what changed. In the 2010s, based on typical pricing, capital structure, and exit values, a deal needed about 5% annual EBITDA growth to reach a 2.5x multiple on invested capital over a five-year hold. With borrowing costs of 8% to 9%, leverage ratios of 30% to 40%, and purchase multiples near record levels, Bain estimates the same 2.5x now takes 10% to 12% annual EBITDA growth. Bain calls this "12 is the new 5."

Holds are also longer. The same release says buyout holding periods at exit now hover around seven years, up from an average of five to six years between 2010 and 2021. A longer hold means more years in which the operating plan has to deliver.

Margin is planned more than it is delivered

Bain's 2025 report looked at software buyouts in detail in Wanted: Margin Growth in Software Investing. Of 33 software buyouts in a proprietary sample, 31 projected margin improvement, with a median of 560 basis points over a five-year hold. Actual margin growth trailed those models badly.

The same report, using DealEdge data for global software buyouts entered from 2014 to 2024, attributes 52% of value creation to revenue growth, 42% to multiple expansion, and 6% to margin expansion. Top-quartile deals were more balanced, with margin expansion contributing 14%.

Carve-outs show a similar pattern. In PE-backed carve-outs used to be reliable winners, Bain reports, using DealEdge data, that sponsors of carved-out companies grew revenue 31% and margins 29% during ownership before 2012. Since 2012, those figures have slipped to 17% and 2%.

These figures come from specific samples, software and large carve-outs, so they do not describe every deal. They do point the same way. Margin plans are common, and the delivery is concentrated in a minority of deals.

Why margin plans miss

The data above does not say why. From the operating side, a few causes come up often enough to plan around.

No baseline. Savings identified in diligence are estimated from headcount and a few invoices. Twelve months later nobody can say what the function cost before, so nobody can say what it costs less.

Savings tracked outside the ledger. A cost program tracked in a spreadsheet of initiatives can show progress while the P&L does not move. Unless the saving shows up in a named general ledger account, it is a forecast.

Cost spread across sites. In a roll-up, the same process often runs differently at each location. The cost of accounts payable or scheduling is hidden in several job titles and several cost centers, so it never appears as one number.

Late reporting. If the monthly package reaches the sponsor on day 25, a problem that started in month three is discussed in month five. Slow reporting does not cause cost overruns, but it lengthens how long they run.

None of these is a strategy problem. They are bookkeeping and reporting problems, which makes them fixable early in a hold.

Where back-office work fits

Back-office cost is rarely the largest lever in a value creation plan. Pricing, sales effectiveness, and procurement usually move more dollars. There are still three reasons to start there.

First, it is measurable from data the company already has. The cost of finance, customer service, or dispatch can be built from payroll and vendor records without a consultant's estimate.

Second, a saving in a recurring cost recurs. A cost that falls and stays down raises EBITDA every year it holds, and exit value is usually priced on EBITDA.

Third, the work builds the reporting the rest of the plan depends on. A clean chart of accounts, a close that finishes on time, and consistent definitions are what let a board see whether pricing or procurement initiatives worked. See Add-On Integration: Mapping the Chart of Accounts in QuickBooks and the QuickBooks Online month-end close checklist.

McKinsey's initial analysis of more than 100 funds with vintages after 2020 found that general partners that focus on creating value through asset operations achieved IRRs up to two to three percentage points higher on average than peers. That is a correlation across funds, not a promise for any one company, but it supports treating operations as core work rather than a side project.

A practical sequence

This is a sequence we would use in a lower-middle-market portfolio company. It assumes the books are in QuickBooks or a similar system and that the company has not done this before.

1. Close the books on a schedule. Before measuring anything, the monthly close has to finish by a fixed working day with every bank and card account reconciled. Everything else depends on this.

2. Map cost to functions. Tag payroll, contractors, and software by function (finance, customer service, dispatch, and so on), using classes, departments, or a simple mapping table. The output is one number per function per month.

3. Freeze a baseline. Take the trailing three or six months, agree on it with management and the sponsor, and write it down. This is the number future savings are measured against.

4. Pick one function. Start where work is repetitive, the cost is visible, and customers do not feel a change in the first weeks. Accounts payable and call handling are common first choices.

5. Report three numbers monthly. Cost of the function against the baseline, the volume it handled, and the error or exception rate. Cost alone can fall because volume fell, so volume belongs next to it.

6. Put the run rate in exit terms. Show the board the annual run-rate change and what it would represent at the company's current valuation multiple, clearly labeled as an illustration.

An illustration of the arithmetic

The figures here are hypothetical and show the math only.

A company with $40 million of revenue and a 12% EBITDA margin has $4.8 million of EBITDA. A 100 basis point improvement in margin, held at the same revenue, adds $400,000 of EBITDA a year. At an assumed 8x EBITDA multiple, that is $3.2 million of enterprise value.

The same arithmetic shows why the baseline matters. If the board cannot see the $400,000 in specific ledger accounts, a buyer's quality of earnings review is unlikely to give credit for it either.

What to ask a portfolio company for

If you are an operating partner starting this conversation, these requests are reasonable in the first month:

  • The close calendar, and the working day the last three closes actually finished
  • A list of every bank, card, and loan account with its last reconciled date
  • Payroll by role and location for the trailing six months
  • Vendor spend by vendor for the trailing twelve months
  • The chart of accounts, with any accounts used by only one site flagged

The answers tell you how soon a baseline can be trusted.

Alignment Capital builds tools for this kind of back-office work in portfolio companies, starting with monthly bookkeeping and call routing.

FAQ

What does "12 is the new 5" mean?

It is Bain's rule of thumb from its 2026 Global Private Equity Report. A typical deal that needed about 5% annual EBITDA growth to return 2.5x over five years in the 2010s now needs roughly 10% to 12%, because of higher borrowing costs, lower leverage, and high entry multiples.

How much of PE value creation comes from margin expansion?

It depends on the sample. For global software buyouts entered from 2014 to 2024, Bain attributes about 6% of value creation to margin expansion overall and 14% in top-quartile deals.

Is cutting back-office cost enough to hit a return target?

Rarely on its own. Revenue growth carries most of the value creation in the data above. Back-office work tends to matter because it recurs and because it produces the reporting the rest of the plan needs.

What is a reasonable first-month request to a new portfolio company?

The close calendar, reconciliation status for every account, payroll by role, vendor spend by vendor, and the chart of accounts.

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